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Abstract 
Institutionalised corruption is an enduring feature of state governance in Indonesia. This article 
analyses the internal logic of the upeti system, how it was established during the New Order 
government and its continuation in the post-Soeharto era. It brings to light how corruption rules 
are shaped through complex socio political relationships reflected in the organisational culture of 
the irrigation agency. Using an anthropological approach to corruption, the article brings to light: 
1) the importance of social relations in shaping institutionalised corruption; 2) how the upeti 
system justifies corruption practices as the prevailing social norm; and 3) the need for structural 
change within the existing political and bureaucratic systems to eradicate corruption. Illustrating 
how corruption rules are embedded in project management procedures, with projects highly 
dependent on donor funding, it highlights the issue’s importance for international agencies and 
development programmes and the need to be more self-consciously and politically aware in 
promoting their development agenda.  
 
Keywords: corruption, government bureaucracy, irrigation sector, Indonesia; Asia 
 
1 Introduction 
Institutionalised corruption is an enduring feature of state governance in Indonesia (Hellman and 
Kaufman, 2001). Created and established during Soeharto’s thirty two years reign, bureaucratic 
rent seeking has become part of government bureaucratic mechanisms and is linked with 
systemic political corruption (Bull and Newell, 1997; Hopkin, 1997). The system has been 
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described by McLeod (2008) as the ‘Soeharto franchise’, portraying a giant extraction machinery 
created to secure political survival of the regime and engender loyalty of bureaucrats to it.
1
  
Blunt et al. (2012a) and Hadiz (2004) provide a comprehensive account of the continuation of 
patronage based governance in post-Soeharto Indonesia, while a growing number of sector wise 
case studies is becoming available on contemporary instances of corruption in Indonesia (see 
Blunt et al. (2012b) on education and health; Olken, 2006 on anti poverty programmes; Rosser 
and Wilson, 2012 on health care; Smith et al., 2003 on logging).  
 
That international development assistance has enhanced and is supporting patronage politics is 
not a new insight.
2
 Our analysis shows that, indeed, the irrigation sector is one of the „so-called 
„wet‟ agencies (those with access to the development budget and to donor funds)‟ (Blunt et al., 
2012a: 70). We will show that also for irrigation „development assistance is a prime target for 
predation by patronage networks and (...) collusion between patronage networks and 
implementing agents in such predation is likely‟ (Blunt et al., 2012a: 76).  
 
                                                          
1 See Bardhan (1997); Kaufmann and Kraay (2002); Treisman (2007) on the link between corruption and 
development. See also Ngo (2008) on how institutionalised corruption could coexist with good 
development performance, under corrupt authoritarian rule in China. 
2
 See McLeod (2008: 212): ‘Within the bureaucracy, management would ordinarily devote part of the so-
called ‘development’ budget, largely deriving from bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, to the payment 
of various allowances, for example, to people who served on project committees and, through them, to 
both their superiors and subordinates in the same area’.  
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While there may be agreement on the existence of systemic corruption and the tenacity of 
patronage based governance in Indonesia in the post-Soeharto period
3
, there exists a diversity of 
approaches to and opinions on two questions: 1) how can institutionalised corruption be best 
analysed and interpreted? 2) how should corruption (therefore) be addressed in policy and 
practice? This article addresses both questions
4
, using the irrigation sector as its example, while 
critically engaging with the literature on corruption in Indonesia and the water sector generally.  
 
The article’s contribution to the analysis of corruption lies in enhancing what might be called a 
‘critical’ approach to corruption. Critical in the sense of questioning the way corruption is treated 
within the mainstream (presently neoliberal) development orthodoxy. Dominated by neo-
institutional economics perspectives, this orthodoxy focuses on the management of ‘incentives’. 
For instance, McLeod’s analysis and approach to reduce corruption are basically a ‘getting the 
prices right’ perspective. He argues that „corruption is only a symptom of a fundamental problem 
of inappropriate personnel management practices in the bureaucracy‟ (2008: 200). The prices 
that need to be set right are the salaries of civil servants managers, their present low level 
explaining the propensity to corrupt behaviour. This analysis is in line with the World Bank’s 
favouring of “appropriate compensation packages” (World Bank, 2003: 107 cited in Blunt et 
                                                          
3
 We agree with Robbins (2000:439) when he states that ‘corruption is an institution, not the absence of 
one’.  For general debate on corruption and strong/weak state institutions, see Goudie and Stasavage 
(1998) and Darden (2008); on corruption as social relationship and its importance for neo-patrimonial 
states, see Evers (1985); Moe (1989); for definitions of corruption see Lu (2000: 275); Johnston (1986).  
4
 In this article we focus mainly on the presentation of our key findings on the role of social relationships 
and organisational culture in shaping institutionalised corruption, and how this contributes to the overall 
discussions on how corruption should be addressed in policy and practice. While we also include how 
some mid career officials from the irrigation agency envisioned to address corruption, we present this 
merely as additional information in our analysis, and not as our main source of data to answer the second 
research question separately.  
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al., 2012a: 70). Blunt et al. (2012a) label such approaches as ‘technocratic reform’5, and they 
argue, in our view convincingly, that the optimism about the efficacy of such approaches is 
misplaced. Moreover, they argue that „the strength and convenience of (mistaken) neo-
institutionalist convictions concerning the efficacy of technocratic reform alone make it unlikely 
that the survival and growth of patronage in the Indonesian civil service will be subjected in the 
medium term to any greater threats than it has been in the past‟ (Blunt et al., 2012a: 78), 
suggesting the practical relevance of conceptual critique.  
Though we agree with McLeod on the instrumental value of Soeharto’s strategy to „set the 
formal salaries of his franchisees low relative to market levels, and [keep] the operating budget 
for most government entities small relative to their cost‟ (McLeod, 2008: 222), reversing this to a 
single factor explanation (and basis for reform) is unwarranted.
6
 As Rosser and Wilson (2012: 
268) note, commenting on the health economics and policy literature, „politics matter much more 
than these perspectives allow‟. As we will show in our analysis of the upeti system as it 
functions in the irrigation sector, culture, or rather the cultural dimension of politics and 
economics, also matter much more for both the analysis and practice of institutionalised 
corruption.  
 
This article highlights the importance of institutions, organisational culture, and social relations, 
embedded in patronage networks in the overall shaping of corruption rules and practices. In our 
analysis of institutionalised corruption we make use of Wade’s (1982, 1985) seminal work on 
corruption in the irrigation sector in India, which provides a description of the ‘systemic’ nature 
of political and administrative corruption with which the Indonesian situation can be usefully 
                                                          
5
 This includes the shaping of ‘good’ policy design and application of ‘best practice’ as well as an 
emphasis on the development of legal structures.   
6
 The simplification involved shows in the concept of human agency employed – ‘government 
bureaucrats (…), like everyone else, were motivated by self-interest’ (McLeod, 2008: 205) Individual 
self-interest no doubt plays a role in social behaviour, but cannot satisfactorily serve as the single human 
motivation in explanatory theory. 
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compared. Wade’s work also suggests the importance of the (macro and micro) politics of 
corruptive practices and their cultural embeddedness. 
 
In terms of policy and practice this leads us to strategies for addressing corruption that 
„incorporates the factors of power [relations] and struggle…which tend to be overlooked by neo-
institutionalist perspectives‟ (Hadiz, 2004: 697). Anti corruption measures based on 
‘technocratic rationality’ attempting to compensate ‘losses’ for government officials from not 
engaging in corrupt practices lack significance, when ‘choices’ to engage in corrupt practices are 
defined primarily by institutional protocols and organisational culture, and are thus not entirely 
based on individuals’ economic interest.  
 
Blunt et al. (2012a: 67) emphasise „factional competition over power and resources‟ as entry 
point to combat corruption, highlighting the role of international donors in providing resources 
for predation and the need to address questions of patronage in development assistance. Their 
analysis urges international donors to focus their reform efforts on how to build „sufficient 
critical mass to outmuscle the opposition‟ (Blunt et al., 2012a: 67). For the irrigation sector, this 
would mean that international donors would have to strategically support segments within the 
irrigation bureaucracy and the wider society that could act as its allies, rather than imposing the 
overall idea of reform through standard technical remedies. From our field research in Indonesia, 
we learn that while such segments might seem non-existent within the formal bureaucratic 
structure of the irrigation agency, they do exist in the periphery where the boundary between 
formal and informal (bureaucratic) networks is blurred. In 1998, conditioned by the political 
climate and the World Bank’s support, some mid-career officials from the irrigation agency 
joined forces with various government ministries, civil society organisations, academics, and 
political party representatives to push for irrigation reform (Author citation, 2008). We argue that 
while this movement by itself cannot remove the existing patronage systems, it reflects the very 
notion of people’s power in state governance.7 Similarly, the appointment of Indonesia’s new 
                                                          
7 See also how new ‘breeds’ of politicians and political leaders with clean track records are emerging, 
fifteen years after the fall of the Soeharto’s New Order government (Otto and Ismar, 2013).  
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president: Joko Widodo in October 2014 reveals not only the prevailing people’s power in 
shaping the final outcome of the presidential election, it also sheds light on the people’s hope and 
determination for a better Indonesia. The question remains as how to bundle this power to 
counteract the dominant interest of ‘patronage democracy’ (Khan, 2005).   
 
Before we move to our analysis of institutionalised corruption in Indonesia we first describe our 
research methodology. We then discuss Wade’s work, introducing the two main components of 
our analysis: the system of administrative corruption, that is, the dynamics of corruption within 
the bureaucratic structure, and the system of political corruption, that is, how corruption practices 
are embedded in and structure the political system. We describe and analyse in detail the 
irrigation agency’s organisational culture, how this shapes the integrative nature of bureaucratic 
corruption in the irrigation sector in Indonesia as well as its connection with the wider political 
system. The three components form a single system, called the upeti system.  
 
2 Research Methodology   
We use an anthropological approach to corruption
8
 (Harrison, 2006) to understand the insiders’ 
view of rules, mechanisms, and procedures applied in institutionalised corruption. For this we 
conducted 100 semi-structured interviews with various actors from government ministries, 
political party representatives, parliament members, academics, and civil society groups as part 
of the first author’s research on irrigation management in Indonesia from September 2003 to 
February 2005. Apart from secondary literature, project documents and media reports, we refer 
to these interviews as our main source of data. We conducted 61 semi-structured interviews with 
officials from the irrigation agency at various administrative levels (national, provincial, district 
and field level) and 16 interviews with additional sources in other government ministries (i.e. 
Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, National Development Planning Agency). 
We carried out 23 semi-structured interviews to capture various political party representatives’, 
                                                          
8
 The approach focuses on the localised meaning of corruption, or how people actually perceive and 
experience corruption, and thus addresses a central problem of contemporary corruption studies as almost 
always reflecting the moral opprobrium of outsiders (Sajo, 1998).  
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parliament members’, academics’, and civil society groups’ perceptions on institutionalised 
corruption. We start with our first series of interviews at the national level, incorporating 
officials from the irrigation agencies, other government agencies, as well as other relevant actors 
operating from the capital Jakarta. The second series of interviews incorporate mainly irrigation 
agency and other government agency staff at respectively provincial, district, and field level. 
 
From our 100 interview respondents, all acknowledge the existence of the upeti system. Sixty-
one interview respondents from the irrigation agency confirm their involvement in the upeti 
system either as upeti ‘distributor’ through their role in project management or as direct and/or 
indirect recipients. Direct recipients are those who receive a certain percentage of project funds, 
based on their bureaucratic position within the irrigation agency (e.g. high officials, direct 
supervisors of project heads). Indirect recipients are those who receive financial support related 
to health, travel, and education expenses from the irrigation agency’s ‘collective funds’, coming 
from a certain percentage of project funds, and managed directly as the agency’s ‘social security 
system’. From our 16 interview respondents from other government ministries and 23 interview 
respondents from political party representatives, parliament members, academics and civil 
society groups, all confirm the existence of the upeti system within the irrigation agency. While 
we rely on information and insights from these 100 interviews as our main source of data, due to 
widespread commonality in how these respondents view and experience upeti system and 
practices, we refer only to a number of interview notes in this article.  
 
We use government officials’ perceptions, insights and understanding of institutionalised 
corruption as our starting point for analysis. To distinguish the insiders’ view from the outsiders’ 
view, we conducted a series of key informant interviews, where we consult, discuss, and verify 
our research findings and preliminary analysis with our resource persons at government 
ministries. To reduce the potential risk of harm to our interview respondents and key informants, 
we focus our analysis mainly on corruption rules and mechanisms, how they are rooted in the 
organisational culture of the irrigation agency and its systemic functioning. As most government 
officials know about this ‘general information’ identities of our interview respondents remains 
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concealed. For the same reason, we do not attempt in this article to use or refer to any specific 
corruption case within the irrigation agency.  
 
We use the term ‘irrigation agency’ to refer to the Directorate General of Irrigation (DGI) and 
the Directorate General of Water Resources and Development (DGWRD), both located under the 
Ministry of Public Works (MPW). In 1999 the MPW and the DGI were abolished following the 
anti corruption movement in Abdurrachman Wahid’s presidency. In 2003, however, officials 
from the DGI regained power, initially through the formation of the DGWRD and later through 
the revival of the MPW (Author citation, 2008). Like the DGI in the past, the DGWRD is in 
charge for irrigation (water resources) policy formulation and project implementation and 
equipped with staff from national down to field level.  
 
3 Corruption as a structural phenomenon in irrigation development  
The most profound analysis of the institutionalisation of corruption in the irrigation sector is 
Wade’s analysis of the system of administrative and political corruption in a South Indian state 
(Wade, 1982, 1985).
9
 In the 30 years since the publication of these papers, very few additional 
analyses of similar quality have been produced.
10
 It is only very recently that the analysis of 
corruption in the water sector has assumed a larger, more systematic scale. The publication of the 
Global Corruption Report (2008) with a specific chapter on corruption in irrigation systems can 
                                                          
9
 For empirical detail, diversity and the complexity of the Indian irrigation corruption system we refer to 
Wade (1982) and (1984).  
10
 Notwithstanding the scarcity of empirical investigations of corruptive practices in the irrigation/water 
sector, the phenomenon has played an important role in global development discourse, notably the neo-
liberal ‘good governance’ perspective. The exemplary paper is Repetto (1986) – a sweeping and seductive 
analysis, but with very little reference to empirical evidence other than Robert Wade’s seminal work on 
India and evidence on the USA. Corruption, however, is a subject with ample ‘tacit knowledge’ available. 
A discussion of the role of corruption in global development discourse is outside the scope of this paper. 
A study confirming Wade’s analysis for a different Indian region and sector is Zwart (1992).  
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be taken as a marker of this more systematic attention. Yet, the report describes the different 
forms of corruption practices that take place in irrigation development, referring primarily to the 
different cycles of irrigation systems development (construction, O&M, rehabilitation, water 
distribution), without further analysis of the political structure and organisational foundation 
underlying this corruption.  
 
In his analysis of ‘the market for public office’ Wade (1985) shows how within the bureaucracy 
the transfer from one post to other desirable posts (those with good amenities and big 
collections), or transfer away from good postings, is governed through market corruption (Scott, 
1972).
11
 Government officials have to pay for new postings as part of the formal system of 
regular transfers, which prescribes transfer within three years. The price for each post reflects the 
amount expected to be earned from that particular post. These earnings are collected corruption 
money from primarily construction contracts and to a smaller extent water management.
12
 The 
market for public office thrives on the uncertainty that is part of the bureaucratic transfer system 
and its whimsical nature. „There are no legitimate procedures by which individuals are entitled 
                                                          
11
 Scott (1972) distinguishes two types of corruption: parochial corruption where access to the favors of 
the power holders was determined by ties of kinship, affection or caste; and market corruption where the 
same access was granted to those who pay the most regardless of who they are. 
12
 In Wade’s late 1970s/early 1980s analysis extracting money from the canals, that is requesting bribes 
from irrigators to secure delivery of scarce canal water, is a significant phenomenon. Intermittent field 
research of the second author in the same region starting from 1991 suggests that in the course of the past 
decades the significance of corruption money from water management has declined, and that from 
physical works thereby relatively increased. One reason for this may be the declining authority and 
reduced staffing of the Irrigation Department within the large scale irrigation systems (see Mollinga, 2003 
for more discussion). This shift in relative importance of sources of corruption money seems not to have 
affected the institutional structure of corruption as described by Wade. 
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to be consulted about their transfers or even to indicate their preferences. No reasons have to be 
given for a transfer, no appeal procedure is available‟ (Wade, 1985: 475).  
 
Public choice theory explains the creation of the market for public office by a lack of economic 
and political competition, and thus the government’s dominance to restrict markets through their 
legislative and regulatory power.
13
 Government domination is apparent in its power to distribute 
highly lucrative government contracts. Government officials used this dominant position as 
means to extract rents. With reference to the report of the Santhanam Committee set up in the 
early 1960s by the Government of India to investigate ways of preventing corruption, Wade 
points out: „in all contracts of construction, purchase, sales, and other regular business on 
behalf of the government, a regular percentage is paid by the parties to the transaction, and this 
is shared in agreed proportions among the various officials concerned‟ (Wade, 1985: 480).  
 
A second condition for institutionalised corruption is the bureaucratic career system. Wade 
identifies the so-called ‘closed career system’ and the way it shapes government officials’ career 
orientation as a basic premise for the preservation and reproduction of market corruption 
mechanisms within the government bureaucracy (Wade, 1985). The closed career system has 
two distinctive features. First, once recruited as part of the bureaucratic personnel, employees 
mostly will remain in the bureaucracy until their retirement. Second, despite the fact that most 
officials will remain in the bureaucracy, high-level bureaucratic positions are eligible only to 
those with certain bureaucratic ranks. Combining these two features, government officials 
logically focus on the advancement of their bureaucratic career as such to be able to obtain these 
high level positions. Hence, the market mechanisms described above became the rule for 
bureaucratic advancement, and thus indirectly force government officials to be corrupt.  
 
                                                          
13
 See Rose-Ackerman (1999) for elaborate discussion on public choice explanations of corruption. 
Central in such explanations is Scully’s argument on how the size and scope of government intervention 
positively correlates with corrupt behavior, especially when this intervention acts as the supply of rents 
(Goel and Nelson, 1998; Scully, 1991). 
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The reproduction of the logic of administrative corruption as just described not only depends on 
factors internal to the bureaucracy: bureaucratic discretion over contracts and the bureaucratic 
career system. The systemic nature of corruption and its reproduction over time strongly depend 
on the link with and embeddedness in the political system. That link and embeddedness can be 
traced by answering two questions: ‘who manages the transfer system?’ and ‘for what is the 
money collected through administrative corruption used?’  
 
In the Indian irrigation bureaucracy the managers of transfers vary with the position concerned. 
Lower level officials’ transfers are handled by senior bureaucrats, higher level officials transfers 
are handled by the Minister. At all levels MLAs (Members of the Legislative Assembly, 
representing geographically defined electoral constituencies) can be, and often are involved. This 
means that the members of the political arm of the state are the ‘top managers’ of the transfer 
system and accumulate considerable amounts of money generated by auctioning transfers. This 
money is used for financing election campaigns (sometimes including direct financial payments 
to reproduce followings/buy votes), to reproduce support in between elections, and to satisfy 
financial demands of higher levels in the political system (like federal state level parties having 
to contribute to the funding of national campaigns of their party). The logic of maintaining one’s 
position as an MLA, Minister or Chief Minister in the political hierarchy is roughly similar to 
that of maintaining one’s position as an irrigation engineer in the irrigation bureaucracy. Party 
‘tickets’ and cabinet posts cost money, and they require money to be maintained, in relation to 
competing fellow politicians, and in relation to the ‘vote banks’. The political system actively 
sources money in the bureaucratic system (which is allocated in the political domain in the first 
place), the crucial lever for which is the control over bureaucratic transfers.
14
  In both domains 
this logic allows considerable room for personal enrichment.  
 
                                                          
14
 MLAs, Ministers and political parties also share in the benefits of construction contracts. For details see 
Wade (1982, 1984, 1985).  
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The Indonesian system of corruption can be analysed using a similar conceptual format of an 
administrative component (organisational culture that structures bureaucratic rent seeking) that is 
embedded in the political system and structures corruption within that. 
 
4 Institutionalised corruption within the Indonesian irrigation agency  
4.1 Upeti: A modern traditional form 
The Indonesian system of corruption is practiced by strategically blurring ‘bribe’ with ‘token of 
appreciation’. This mimics a centuries old political system of gift giving: the upeti system 
(Wertheim, 1970).
15
 Upeti literally means: ‘tribute to the king from his followers’. The upeti 
system was initially applied in the feudal period, where a king’s power was measured by the 
amount of tribute he received from his followers. In return for tribute, the king would protect the 
local population from outside threats (such as foreign invasion). In modern day Indonesia, the 
upeti system forms the basis of institutionalised corruption. As stated in Prakoso and Suryati: 
„Corruption practices were institutionalised with the establishment of the upeti system‟ (Prakoso 
and Suryati, 1986: 27). Government officials focus their career advancement through upeti 
delivery (in cash and kind) to high ranking officials in return for desirable bureaucratic positions. 
Established during the New Order government’s thirty two years reign upetism continues to be 
practiced in the post-Soeharto era. 
 
The incorporation of the upeti system into government bureaucratic mechanisms is structurally 
conditioned by the unification of official and private life within the Indonesian bureaucracy. As 
stated by Robison: ‘The Indonesian bureaucracy is a product of patrimonial bureaucratic 
authority, in which the demarcation between public and private interest is at best blurred‟ 
(Robison, 1978: 24). The upeti system was already applied within the government ministries in 
                                                          
15
 See also Yang (1989) on the importance of personal relationship and social exchange in Chinese gift 
economy of ‘guanxi’, which highlights the ethics of obligation, reciprocity, mutual aid, and the 
responsibility of friendship and kinship.  
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Indonesia prior to the introduction of the so-called project approach
16
 for implementing (donor 
assisted) development interventions in the late 1960s. However, the project approach has worked 
as the medium to integrate the existing (‘traditional’) system into a modern capitalist economy 
(cf. Riggs (1966) on bureaucratic capitalism), and thus made upetism to continue to flourish.  
 
At a personal level, the application of the upeti system represents government officials’ interest 
in getting private gain (primarily in the form of financial enrichment but not limited to that) from 
their bureaucratic positions. As a retired official from the irrigation agency stated: „Nowadays, 
government agency staff‟s work orientation is directed primarily by their interest in increasing 
their personal wealth using their bureaucratic position‟ (interview with retired official from the 
irrigation agency, 2003).  
 
Within the Indonesian irrigation agency, institutionalised corruption is practiced as part of 
project management activities on infrastructure development often funded by international 
donors. As expressed by official from the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA): “The irrigation 
agency‟s technical knowledge and experience enabled them to manipulate the project financial 
report concerning infrastructure development, in such a way that it is almost impossible for an 
outsider to discover that the report had been manipulated” (interview with official from MoA, 
2003). Furthermore, as stated by an official from the irrigation agency: “The irrigation agency 
could artificially increase the unit costs for systems construction and rehabilitation without 
anyone would have ever noticed the flaw in its financial report and actual infrastructure 
development” (interview with official from the irrigation agency, 2003).   
 
That the practice of upetism continues to be rampant within the irrigation agency in the post-
Soeharto era is evident from the Public Works minister’s speech at the formal inauguration of 
ministerial high officials, on 6 November 2003. This speech was titled „No obligation to deliver 
upeti to high officials‟. The minister emphasised the need to eliminate corruption practices rooted 
                                                          
16
 Following the adoption of project development approach donor funds are channeled directly to the 
project management unit. Responsible for the overall management of the unit is a project head.  
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in the upeti system. In the minister’s words: „I hereby emphasise that the obligation to deliver 
upeti to high officials should be abolished. Upeti should be forbidden‟ (speech given by the 
minister of the Ministry of Public Works under which the irrigation agency is located, as 
reported in Suara Pembaruan national newspaper, 7 November 2003). While the minister’s 
speech urges the need to abolish the practice of institutionalised corruption within the irrigation 
agency, it also reveals a set of rules (e.g. informal obligation to deliver upeti to high officials) 
that resemble the basic norms in institutionalised corruption within the irrigation agency. We 
argue that it is through the incorporation of these rules and norms into the irrigation agency’s 
organisational culture that corruption becomes institutionalised and forms an integral part of 
systemic political corruption.  
 
4.2 The irrigation agency‟s organisational culture  
Highlighting the importance of cultural dimension in the analysis and practice of institutionalised 
corruption, we illustrate how the economic logic of institutionalised corruption is embedded in 
the irrigation agency’s organisational culture and structure of social relations (Anand et al., 
2005). In particular, we look at how the irrigation agency’s organisational values, norms, and 
behaviour reframe staff’s perceptions on corruption as ‘desirable’ and ‘normal’ practice17 
(Anand et al., 2005; Vittel et al., 1993) as revealed in: 1) the establishment of a ‘social cocoon’ 
(Ashforth and Anand, 2003); 2) the relationship between project head and his/her bureaucratic 
supervisor; and 3) the distinction between budgetary and non-budgetary funds.  
4.2.1 A social cocoon: The agency’s inner circle of power 
The practice of upetism within the irrigation agency relies on both the formal system and an 
informal system of control (Campbell and Goritz, 2014). Senior bureaucrats sustain and 
reproduce the application of the upeti system through the establishment of irrigation agency 
staff’s inner circles of power or so-called ‘social cocoons’ (Ashforth and Anand, 2003) at 
different administrative levels (from national down to sub-district) (see also Eisenstadt and 
Roniger, 1986; Antlov and Cederoth, 1994 on the history and dynamics of these inner circles of 
                                                          
17
 See also Ashforth and Anand (2003) on how organisational culture facilitates the process of 
‘normalization’ in corrupt organisations and shapes staff’s behavior.  
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power). At national level, the inner circle of power comprised of the minister and his/her trusted 
high officials (both active and retired). At regional level, the inner circle of power consisted of 
the head of the irrigation agency and his/her close staff at respectively provincial and district 
levels. Working in concert, this multi level inner circle of power established corruption rules as 
regard upeti delivery, allocation, and (re)distribution within the irrigation agency. As expressed 
by mid-career official from the irrigation agency: „The minister could forbid upeti delivery, but 
he cannot stop irrigation agency staff to deliver upeti to high officials, even when he wanted to, 
as long as upeti delivery forms one of the basic requirements for bureaucratic advancement‟ 
(interview with mid-career official from the irrigation agency, 2003). 
 
Administratively, this inner circle of power is established in accordance with the defined echelon 
system. That system categorizes government officials into echelon one (minister and his/her 
advisory team), echelon two (directors general, directors, inspector general and secretary 
general), echelon three (head of sections within the directorate), and echelon four (remaining 
staff). Representing the ‘modern bureaucratic state’ in Weberian bureaucracy (Weber, 1921), the 
echelon system features a distribution of authority arranged systematically in accordance with 
generally applicable rules, and a hierarchy of offices that corresponds with a fixed order of 
procedural affairs dealt with according to the defined regulations. Within the Indonesian 
irrigation bureaucracy, however, the system is configured as bureaucratic guideline for 
institutionalised corruption. Firstly, upeti delivery is channeled from officials from lower 
echelons to those from higher echelons. Secondly, officials from echelon one and two manage 
the overall fund allocation originating from the upeti system. Thirdly, while upeti (re) allocation 
is done with reference to one’s position/rank in the echelon system, upeti delivery is distributed 
equally among officials who hold the same echelon level.  
Politically, membership composition of this inner circle of power mirrors the dominant political 
alliance. During the New Order government the inner circle of power within the irrigation 
agency was formed following the line of leadership within Golkar as the ruling political party at 
that time. At the cabinet level, minister positions were held by officials closely linked to Golkar. 
At the ministerial level, the minister formed his/her inner circle of power through the 
appointment of party cadres as his/her high officials. At regional level, leadership positions 
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within the provincial and district irrigation agency went to officials with connection to Golkar 
representatives.  
 
In the post-Soeharto era, minister positions continue to be held by officials with close connection 
with the president and the ruling political party. During Abdurrachman Wahid’s presidency, the 
Ministry of Public Works (MPW) was abolished and replaced by the Ministry of Settlement and 
Regional Development (Kimbangwil) in 1999. Erna Witoelar, an environmentalist with close 
connection to Abdurrachman Wahid became the Kimbangwil minister. In 2001 Kimbangwil was 
replaced with the Ministry of Settlement and Regional Infrastructure (Kimpraswil) following the 
presidential change from Abdurrachman Wahid to Megawati Soekarnoputri. Soenarno, a senior 
official at the former MPW and a PDI-P party (the ruling political party at that time) cadre 
replaced Erna Witoelar and later changed back the name to MPW. At the ministerial level, the 
irrigation agency’s inner circle of power was de-activated with the abolition of the MPW in 
1999, but regained its power in 2001 and continues to work in similar way like before. 
 
4.2.2 The relationship between project head and his/her bureaucratic supervisor 
The practice of upetism within the irrigation agency is centred on the relationship between a 
project head and his/her bureaucratic supervisors. High officials use their bureaucratic decision-
making power as a resource to trade bureaucratic positions and ensure upeti delivery from their 
staff. Data gathered from interviews with various officials from the irrigation agency indicated 
that officials in the agency would have to deliver money, luxury goods, and additional services to 
their supervisors to ensure bureaucratic promotion and/or to get a project head position. The 
latter is considered as one of the best positions in the agency due to the access to project funds 
that it provides (Author citation, 2008). Similarly, high officials within the agency select their 
candidate for the project head position primarily based on their interests to use the position as 
their service point for upeti delivery. Using a similar metaphor as ‘service point’, a project head 
is often referred as ‘ATM’ (automatic teller machine), from which high officials could 
‘automatically’ withdraw their money request (interview with high officials from the MoA and 
the NDPA).  
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Prior to the candidate’s appointment as a project head, the future-to-be project head and his/her 
bureaucratic supervisor agree on their ‘informal work relationship’, where patronage is 
rationalized under a notion of ‘unstated contract’ (Waterbury, 1973). Following their 
appointments and protected by their bureaucratic supervisors, project heads focus on 
manipulating the management of project funds in such a way that they can use the funds to 
deliver an even higher amount of upeti, to ensure their position, if not further bureaucratic 
promotion.  
 
Contrary to what has been suggested by principal agent theory (Groenendijk, 1997), our analysis 
shows that institutionalised corruption is driven by shared rather than divergent interests and 
knowledge between principals and agents. The principal agent model of corruption assumes the 
reasons for an individual to engage in corruption (say, to pay a bribe) to be located in the trade-
offs between different kinds of costs to effectuate a transaction (such as monitoring costs, 
bonding costs, and residual loss). In this model there is a difference of interest and knowledge 
between the principal (the bribe taker) and the agent (the bribe giver). This difference does not 
exist in the Indonesian case as the (social) relationship between project head and his/her 
bureaucratic supervisor ‘distorts’ the very foundation of the assumed trade-offs simply because 
both the principal and the agent have a shared, common interest in preserving bureaucratic rent 
seeking practices (Schulte-Nordholt, 1987). As said by a high official from the irrigation agency 
we interviewed: “The irrigation agency covered all my personal expenses during my holiday 
tour in Europe together with my wife because my idea to change the dam design has worked very 
well to reduce the actual cost of dam construction to be significantly lower than the budgeted 
cost” (interview with a high official from the irrigation agency, 2004). This shared, common 
interest in preserving bureaucratic rent seeking practices manifested in staff’s acceptance of 
corrupt practices conducted by their peers and bureaucratic supervisors. As stated by an official 
from the irrigation agency: “When a high official in the irrigation agency invited us to come to 
his/her luxury house, we gather that s/he could afford such house simply because its total price 
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represents only a very small percentage (one percent) of the total budgeted cost for dam 
construction” (interview with official from the irrigation agency, 2004)18.  
 
4.2.3 Budgetary and non-budgetary funds 
The practice of upetism within the irrigation agency is also supported by an informal system of 
financial control (Campbell and Goritz, 2014): the so-called ‘double book keeping’, which refers 
to the manipulation of project funds through the distinction of project funds into budgetary and 
non-budgetary funds.  
 
The budgetary fund is an officially registered project fund that is supposed to be used to conduct 
project activities. The non-budgetary funds are the part of the project fund that is informally used 
by the irrigation agency to cover its bureaucratic ‘expenses’, without these expenses being 
officially registered
19
 (Author citation, 2008). As explained by an official in the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MoA): ‘In general, government ministries in Indonesia have both formal and 
informal financial systems. The management of this informal financial system varies between 
ministries, depending on the inter-personal relationship within the particular ministry. Yet, the 
management of both non-budgetary and budgetary funds is conducted like the two sides of a 
coin‟ (interview with an official from the MoA, 2003 and 2004). In addition, a separate book 
keeping system is maintained next to the formal book keeping. The main difference between the 
book keeping for budgetary and non-budgetary funds expenditure is that the record of non-
budgetary fund management is never presented to the public. While we never physically saw the 
books used to record the double book keeping at national level, irrigation agency officials at 
provincial and district level showed the books to the first author during interviews, confirming 
not only the standardized corruption rules and mechanisms but also the widespread practice of 
institutionalised corruption across government administrative levels.  
                                                          
18
 This point is also confirmed by other officials from the irrigation agency, MoA, and MoHA we 
interviewed. 
19
 Cf. Lu’s (2000) description of the practice of ‘small coffers’ or secret funds kept by government 
agencies in the current Chinese system. 
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The distinction enables the project heads to both register and conceal upeti delivery. Thus, unlike 
in the principal agent model of corruption, where the principal and the agent have something to 
hide from each other, in the practice of upetism both the principal and the agent have a shared 
knowledge on how both fund management systems work and are interconnected, as well as 
common interest to sustain their functioning.  
 
This ‘double book keeping’ highlights the role of project financial reports as a mere 
administrative exercise. Project financial reports do not reflect actual fund management. As 
stated by mid-career officials from the MoA and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA): „High 
officials‟ role to monitor actual project fund expenditure by the project head became 
meaningless due to their common interests in manipulating the management of the project fund‟ 
(interview with officials from the MoA and the MoHA, 2004). Or as stated in the World Bank 
report on corruption in Indonesia: „While there is no shortage of auditing, the audit process is 
flawed‟ (World Bank, 2003).  
 
4.3 Upeti„s integrative character and self-generating mechanisms 
The irrigation agency’s organisational culture shapes staff’s perception of corruption as 
something ‘normal’ and ‘acceptable’. In line with Hofstede’s (1991) four major cultural 
dimensions: power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance, we discuss 
how institutionalised corruption within the irrigation agency is driven and facilitated by: 1) 
collective culture within the agency; 2) how less powerful individuals in the agency accept 
power inequality; 3) value of material success in conjunction with a concern for the weak; and 4) 
staff’s ability to operate in ‘uncertain’ working environment. 
 
Unlike the neo-institutional economics approach, which assumes that actors act rationally to 
maximize their self-interest, the upeti system relies on the collective culture within the irrigation 
agency. This collective culture is most apparent from the project head’s role in upeti collection 
and distribution. As said by a project head we interviewed: “As a project head you have to be 
able to divide and allocate the funds to reward those that play important roles in securing the 
funds (e.g. Director General, Secretary General) while at the same time also ensure that funds 
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are distributed „equally‟ according to one‟s position in the bureaucratic hierarchy” (interview 
with official who also hold the position of project head in the irrigation agency, 2004). 
 
Generally, the project head would take ten per cent from the total project fund, while disbursing 
another twenty per cent to the high officials within the agency (including the secretary general 
and inspector general in the ministry) regardless of their involvement in project activities.
20
 At 
provincial level, between ten and fifteen per cent of the remaining funds are directly distributed 
to the head of the provincial irrigation agency and his close aides. At district level, the project 
head disburses another ten per cent of the remaining funds among officials in the district 
irrigation agency (see figure 1).
21
  
 
The project head plays an important role in enlarging the scope and coverage of bureaucratic 
networks, beyond the formal bureaucratic role and responsibility of government ministries, as 
well as beyond the distinction between executive and legislative government bodies, and 
sometimes blurring the distinction between public and private agencies. The project head plays 
an important role in negotiating with the different parties involved (high officials within the 
                                                          
20
 In practice, the percentage received by each actor varies from one project to another, depending on the 
way the project head negotiates this share with his/her supervisor and the contractors. For example, the 
contractor would agree to channel twenty per cent of the fund to the high officials if the project head 
agreed to ‘ignore’ the marking up in the contractor’s proposal. However, the contractor might agree to 
channel only ten per cent of the fund to the high officials when the negotiation is tiresome, and the project 
proposal is made strictly, with less possibility for marking up.  
21
 As regards order of magnitude of upeti practice across ministries and sectors, the Executive Director 
(Rizal Ramli) from the Indonesian Economics, Industry and Trade Advisory group estimates that thirty 
percent of the total amount of foreign loans received by the Indonesian government until 1997 (that is 
almost US$ 13 billion) has been lost through corrupt avenues at the national level (Bisnis Indonesia 
newspaper, 3 September 1998).  
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irrigation agency, contractors, and the State Audit Agency or BPKP and the Supreme Audit 
Agency or BPK) on how much they will receive from the mark up of the overall project 
overhead.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of project benefits to irrigation agency staff and contractors  
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Source: Author citation, 2008
22
 
 
By widening his/her corruption network, the project head not only eliminates the risk of 
participating in corruption activities, s/he also establishes a wide if not all inclusive corruption 
network, and changes the trend of thinking of the agency staff with regard to corruption. As 
expressed by a number of the staff in the irrigation agency: „If one does not participate in 
corruption practices, one cannot advance one‟s bureaucratic career within the irrigation agency 
                                                          
22
 Data presented in Figure 1 is derived from our interviews with the irrigation agency staff from national 
down to district level. From our interview respondents across administrative levels (national, provincial, 
district), we found that the data collected at each level matches with the overall proportion of fund 
distribution. This shows that actors involved in institutionalised corruption are aware about their share 
and others’. But most importantly, it confirms the establishment of rules and norms in institutionalised 
corruption practices as embedded in the irrigation agency’s organisational culture.  
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as one is no longer part of the agency‟ (interviews with irrigation agency staff, April 2004). Or, 
as pointed out by Bull and Newell: „Where systemic corruption develops, then not participating 
is no longer a sign of honesty, but rather lack of power, weakness or incompetence‟ (Bull and 
Newell, 1997: 179).  
 
The upeti system also acts as the irrigation agency’s informal23 ‘social security system’. It 
regulates the element of personal greed and the importance of interpersonal relationships and to a 
certain extent concern for the weak through the redistribution of corruption funds to supports the 
agency’s bureaucratic services to its staff. Apart from upeti delivery to each individual official, 
under instruction of the minister and his/her inner circle of power, the project head would reserve 
a certain amount from the non-budgetary fund as the agency’s financial back-up. Through this 
reservation, corruption money trickles down to almost all of the irrigation agency’s personnel. 
As said by an official from the irrigation agency: “The irrigation agency covers health, 
education, and social expenses of its staff (such as when some officials are severely ill, need 
support to finance their children‟s higher education, or extra cash to celebrate a wedding 
ceremony) relying primarily on the reserved funds” (interview with official from the irrigation 
agency, 2004)
24
. Here, the upeti system functions as a patronage system, where „the patron[s] 
look after their followers in a fatherly, moral, and emotional…sense‟ (Blunt et al., 2012a: 67). 
Important to note here is the way the agency uses its ‘social security’ system as a disciplining 
system, to reward and punish its staff. For instance, the reserved funds can only be used to cover 
health costs of those officials whose conduct is in line with the irrigation agency’s organisational 
rules (interviews with officials from the irrigation agency, the MoA, MoHA and NDPA, 2003 
and 2004).  
 
                                                          
23
 See Robbins (2000) on the role of informal institutions in creating, sustaining and reproducing 
corruption practices, which contests the current line of thinking that corruption occurs due to the absence 
of a strong state and a lack of order (Goudie and Stasavage, 1998).   
24
 Other officials from the irrigation agency also confirmed this point during our separate interviews.  
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The way the upeti system functions as a collective tool for funds (if not income) redistribution 
(Hopkin, 1997) transforms extraordinary stakes of corruption into routine ones, and ensures that 
corrupted funds are at least or to some extent ‘fairly’ distributed. Routine stakes are stakes of 
modest scale, and while often in short supply are at least available on a continuing basis. 
Extraordinary stakes, on the other hand, are unusually valuable and scarce, such as very large 
construction contracts (Johnston 1986). Within the upeti system actors do not seek more than 
what has been allocated to them, as they think that they receive their ‘fair’ share. This perception 
of fairness reflects how actors perceive their individual positioning towards the centre of power 
(Hofstede, 1991) resembled through the irrigation agency’s formal hierarchy (referring to the 
echelon system as well as their connection with the ruling political party). As expressed by mid-
career official from the MoA: „the way the irrigation agency transforms the upeti system as its 
informal social security system does not only incorporate all staff in institutionalised corruption 
practices, it also unifies staff‟s position and view on their „fair‟ share of the corrupted fund‟  
(interview with mid-career official from the MoA, 2004). This said, competition between 
officials does occur from time to time, both in terms of upeti collection and delivery.  
 
Last but not least, the upeti system functions as an informal yet decisive performance evaluation 
system within the irrigation agency. As one’s ability to pull in project funds, negotiate project 
agreements, and deliver some part of project funds as upeti to his/her bureaucratic supervisor 
become the main indicators for one’s bureaucratic career advancement, officials in the irrigation 
agency navigate through an ‘uncertain’ working environment, relying mainly on social 
relationships with their peers and high officials in the agency.   
 
5 The upeti system as the foundation of political corruption  
Established during the Soeharto regime, the political relationship between president and his/her 
ministers continues to be the political foundation of the upeti system in the post Soeharto era. 
Hadiz (2004: 711) states that this is possible because „predatory interests nurtured under the 
Soeharto regime‟s formerly vast, centralised system of patronage…have largely survived and 
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remain intact‟.25 The ministerial position continues to function as the president’s financial 
resource to sustain and reproduce his/her political power. Here, the minister becomes the 
president’s means to illegally access public money (development funds or foreign loans), which 
can be channeled to finance the president’s political campaigns during the country’s national 
election (Scott, 1969). As a general rule in the post-Soeharto era, a minister’s access to sector 
development funds continues to be the president’s crucial weapon to direct the overall outcome 
of the election, as elections are primarily steered by the practice of both legal and illegal money 
politics, where a political party can literally buy people’s votes relying on their access to 
government ministerial development funds (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2010).  
 
The president and his/her ministers have a shared interest in sustaining the application of upeti 
system, in a fashion not dissimilar to the relationship between a project head and his/her 
supervisors. Government ministers have no reason to fear that the president will report 
corruption practices within their respective ministry to the parliament or the Supreme Audit 
Agency, as long as they ensure sufficient amount of upeti delivery to the president.
 26
 Similarly, 
the president has no reason to eliminate rent seeking practices within the government ministries 
because s/he relies on the upeti delivery from ministers to sustain political power. The current 
government’s promise to eradicate corruption appears little more than empty rhetoric when the 
president has few incentives to investigate those involved in ransacking the state’s public 
funding (East Asia Forum, 2011). In the eyes of many observers progress with fighting 
                                                          
25
 For evidence on the sustenance of these predatory interests see also Sentana and Hariyanto (2013) for 
the case of institutionalised corruption within the Constitutional Court (one of the highest state’s judicial 
organs). The case focuses on recent allegations made by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) 
to a top judge for receiving money in relation to his role to monitor vote counts in the political election.  
26
 See Nelken and Levi (1996) on how endemic corruption is produced and reproduced through 
widespread co-optation of almost all sectors within the government, involving not only the executive and 
parliament members as the main actors in political corruption, but also the judiciary, state audit agency, 
media and the military. 
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corruption in Indonesia has been minimal (Blunt et al., 2012a; Hadiz, 2003; Hamilton-Hart, 
2001). As said by mid-career official from the irrigation agency: „To be meaningful, efforts to 
eliminate rent seeking practices within the irrigation agency should be linked to the wider 
bureaucratic and political reform‟ (interview with mid-career official from the irrigation agency, 
2004).  
 
Within the context of systemic political corruption, the president gives political allies strategic 
positions in the cabinet, while replacing those who belong to the political opposition group. In 
the 1990s, the domination of Soeharto’s cronies in government top positions was so obvious that 
other government officials cynically referred to them as graduates of the ‘Cendana University’ 
(World Bank, 2003). Cendana is the street name where Soeharto’s family lives. Referring to the 
street name, Soeharto’s family is also referred as the ‘Cendana family’. In addition, the president 
would position his/her most loyal allies in those ministries with huge development budgets, such 
as the Ministry of Public Works (MPW), under which the irrigation agency operates. In the post-
Soeharto era, Megawati Soekarnoputri and her ruling political party (PDI-P) applied the same 
strategy and mechanisms, perhaps with much less systemic outcomes as a result of disintegration 
of the ‘franchise’ system (McLeod, 2005). As expressed by an official from the National 
Development Planning Agency (NDPA): „During the country‟s national election, the MPW 
continued to be one of those ministries informally referred to as the president‟s „milk cow‟‟ 
(interview with official from the NDPA, 2003).
27
  
 
At the ministerial level, each minister would appoint his/her staff based also on their political 
connection with the ruling political party. This nested political connection is important especially 
if the minister has to cover up financial misconduct in supporting the president’s political 
campaign. In this context, the minister’s power is defined by his/her ability to build personal and 
political alliances within the formal organisational structure of the ministry. 
 
                                                          
27 The view was supported by officials from the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and the Ministry of Home 
Affairs (MoHA). 
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In the post-Soeharto era, especially after the direct presidential election in 2004, the upeti system 
evolved from serving one hegemonic master (Soeharto and his alliance) to multiple masters with 
various bureaucratic and political background and interests (Khan, 2005). Political relations 
between the president and his/her ministers evolved from a single party domination (the ruling 
political party) to multiple parties’ political coalition. When Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
became the first Indonesian president directly elected by the people in 2004, his Democratic 
Party (Partai Demokrat) did not win the election and was not the ruling party. Nevertheless, he 
preserved the political ties between political party-president-ministers through political coalition 
with Golkar and other political parties, keeping the political foundation for the upeti system 
intact, while at the same time also increasing political power of his Democratic Party. This is 
most apparent from the way he reshuffled his cabinet in 2011 based primarily on ‘political 
transactions’ to ensure strategic positioning of his political allies (East Asia Forum, 2011).28 
While the appointment of Joko Widodo as Indonesia’s 7th president in October 2014 may 
considerably change the political relations between the president and his/her ministers, as 
evidenced by his close connection with the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK), strong 
motivation to strengthen government’s ability to deliver better services to the people, and as 
revealed by strong opposition from the existing political elites (e.g. Red and White Coalition or 
KMP) to his presidency, this remains to be seen in the coming years of his first term of 
presidency.  
 
6 Discussion and conclusions  
In Indonesia institutionalised corruption is produced and reproduced as an integral part of the 
States’ governing structure. Our analysis illustrates how the upeti system survived the political 
turmoil and regime change in 1998. It highlights the system’s ability to adapt to the new 
bureaucratic and political constellations and reveals the institutional role of corruption as part of 
the Indonesian government’s bureaucratic mechanisms. Our analysis of institutionalised 
corruption within the irrigation agency provides three main findings.  
                                                          
28
 See also Dorling (2011) for evidence that supports the analysis of the sustenance of political party-
president-ministers as the political foundation for the upeti system.  
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First, it shows that the trade-offs between different kinds of costs to effectuate corruption is 
determined by the larger institutional set up, beyond one’s economic rationale. Our research in 
Indonesia reveals that rather than thinking in terms of economic gains/losses or driven by 
rational, self-interested behaviour, quite a number of the irrigation agency staff felt they are 
‘obliged’ to engage in corruption practices simply because they see themselves as part of the 
larger social cultures and political networks of upetism. As expressed by mid-career official from 
the irrigation agency: „One‟s involvement in corruption practices is linked to one‟s social 
relationships and political networks, and less on one‟s choice and how they perceive corruption 
practices in the first place‟ (interview with official from the irrigation agency, 2004). This 
highlights the importance of social relations and organisational culture embedded in (political) 
patronage networks in shaping institutionalised corruption, where systemic corruption is shaped 
through different types of complimentary, intertwining social relationships ranging from 
bureaucratic patronage (between the project head and his/her supervisor; between high official 
and his/her staff), business relationships (between the project head and contractor), to political 
alliances (between president and his/her ministers; the minister and his/her inner circle of 
power).  
 
Second, our analysis demonstrates how the upeti system prevails over public and legal anti 
corruption discourses because it is politically grounded and culturally embedded. Unlike the 
public and legal anti corruption discourses, which are external to the everyday practices of 
administrative and political corruption, upetism operates within and structures that domain. 
Putting the notion of gift giving and loyalty to family or clan, rather than the rule of law, central 
in the practice of institutionalised corruption, the upeti system not only provides psychological 
atonement for being involved in corruption practices, it also justifies corruption practices as the 
prevailing social norm.
29
 As said by mid-career official from the irrigation agency: „Government 
                                                          
29
 For an Indian example of the cultural embeddedness of corruption, see Ruud (2002); for its pre-colonial 
roots in lordship, see Price (1999). 
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officials involved in corruption practices do not view this involvement as a stigma, but merely as 
an opportunity to extend their career and income‟ (interview with official from the NDPA, 
2004).  
 
Still related to the second point, our analysis highlights the need for mainstreaming a critical 
approach to corruption towards the shaping of a more (politically and culturally) grounded anti 
corruption strategy. Future anti corruption strategy in irrigation sector development cannot be 
formulated in isolation from the irrigation agency’s organisational culture and how this sets the 
prevailing social norm for institutionalised corruption. While understanding the irrigation 
agency’s organisational culture is crucial to inform the overall shaping of future anti corruption 
strategy, it is critical for international donors and policy makers to recognize that this 
organisational culture is also penetrable to internal and external influences. Referring to how 
some mid-career officials from the irrigation agency initiated policy reform processes in the 
irrigations sector development through the shaping of strategic alliances involving various 
government ministries, civil society organizations, academics, and political party representatives, 
we argue that the formulation of grounded anti corruption strategy should be centered on 
incorporating needs and aspirations of this pocket of resistance within the irrigation agency. 
While anti corruption efforts to counter argue and change the prevailing social norm within the 
irrigation agency can be initiated through external pressures (e.g. donors development agenda, 
funding conditionality), to be effective, it would need to be internalised into the irrigation 
agency’s organisational culture. As said by mid-career official from the MoA: „Policy reform 
cannot rely on external forces alone, but should find its entry point to counter argue the 
irrigation agency‟s identity and organizational culture from within‟ (interview with mid-career 
official from MoA, 2003). International donors and policy makers could help strengthen the role 
of this pocket of resistance through their funding conditionality, which required the irrigation 
agency to work together with accountable agencies and institutions that would act both as partner 
and third party observer, towards strengthening of the agency’s service provision role and its 
accountability towards farmers.  
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This is in line with Blunt et al.’s (2012b) proposition to put the notion of social justice central in 
anti corruption strategy. The concept of social justice highlights not only the need to allocate „the 
greatest benefit to the least advantaged members of society, [but also ensures that] each person 
[and thus not only those belonging to the government bureaucracy and political system] has 
equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties‟ (Rawls, 1985: 227). 
Giving the notion of social justice central place in the anti corruption agenda could, we suggest, 
help to reduce the cultural embeddedness of institutionalised corruption by transforming the 
current dominant perception of corruption from a prevalent social norm to a cultural stigma.  
 
Within the irrigation agency, this ‘battle of minds and perceptions’ on corruption can be derived 
from how some mid-career officials in the agency work closely with academics and civil society 
groups to provide counter arguments on how the irrigation agency continues to focus on 
infrastructure development as means to mobilise project funds and secure fund sources for 
institutionalised corruption. As expressed by mid-career official from the irrigation agency: „A 
shift from infrastructure-oriented development to field-level interventions to improve service 
provision towards more equal water delivery could serve as the first building block to contest 
corruption rules by including farmers into the overall equation‟  (interview with mid-career 
official from the irrigation agency, 2004).  
 
This ‘battle of minds and perceptions’ on corruption would have to be accompanied by 
appropriate structural change within the existing political system. We propose that anti 
corruption strategy not only has to represent a combination of top down and bottom up 
approaches (Pope, 1999), but it also to a certain extent needs to rely on forces and dynamics 
within the existing political structure, to support and initiate endogenous reform. In this light, 
Joko Widodo’s presidency and his new cabinet (with all its political imperfection) may be an 
entry point to initiate the envisioned structural change. For example, as the Governor of Jakarta 
Province (2012-2014), Joko Widodo came up with the idea of e-budgeting as transparent 
financial mechanism to be applied by government agencies across administrative levels. Later, 
after winning the presidential election, the new Governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama pursued the 
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idea further and presented it to the Parliament members, resulting in political struggle that later 
in the debate unraveled practices of institutionalised corruption in the budget approval system. 
The new Jakarta Governor’s pursuit to apply e-budgeting as a transparent budgeting system for 
government bureaucracy across administrative levels not only brings to light how the current 
government attempts to tackle the problem of institutionalised corruption through a more 
structural approach --by changing the rules of the game—but also to move beyond the commonly 
applied approaches to eradicate corruption by legal means (through for instance the current 
positioning of the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK)). Understanding and monitoring 
how this potential game changer materializes in practice is eminent to identify potential 
pathways and broaden the efforts to fight corruption as part of wider social movement driven in 
the end by government’s and people’s aspirations to improve state governance.  
 
Last but not least, the way the upeti system discursively, institutionally and financially integrates 
administrative and political corruption practices suggests the need for international donors to be 
more self-consciously politically aware in promoting their development agenda. When 
corruption practices are facilitated by certain administrative structures, changing (elements of) 
these structures may reduce corruption. An example would be to create different scenarios in 
loan repayment (i.e. bilaterally, sectorally, regionally) as part of the overall budget reform (Ma 
and Ni, 2008; Ngo, 2008) as entry points for anti corruption efforts. Nevertheless, without strong 
political rooting, there is always a risk that anti corruption measures (no matter how structural 
they are) would be twisted to serve powerful interests. How to combine people’s power and 
donors’ commitment with accountable political leadership) remains the key structural challenge 
in fighting institutionalised corruption (Gunn, 2014).  
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